Narrative as active inference: an integrative account of cognitive and social functions in adaptation

Front Psychol. 2024 Jun 6:15:1345480. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1345480. eCollection 2024.

Abstract

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future-even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative.

Keywords: active inference; enculturation; episodic memory; future projections; narrative; narrative identity; storytelling practices.

Grants and funding

The author(s) declare financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. This work was carried out with the support of European Research Council Synergy Grant (XSCAPE) ERC-2020-SyG 951,631, by the Australian Laureate Fellowship project A Philosophy of Medicine for the 21st Century (Ref: FL170100160) and by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council doctoral fellowship (Ref: 752–2019-0065) (to AC).