We suggest here a model of the origin of the phenomenal world via the naturalization of logical conflict or incompatibility (which is broader than, but includes logical contradiction). Physics rules out the reality of meaning because of the method of formalization, which requires that logical conflicts cannot be part of the model. We argue that (a) meaning-making requires a logical conflict; (b) logical conflict assumes a phenomenal present; (c) phenomenological specious present occurs in living systems as widely as meaning-making; (d) it is possible to provide a physiological description of a system in which the phenomenal present appears and choices are made; (e) logical conflict, or incompatibility itself, is the mechanism of intentionality; (f) meaning-making is assured by scaffolding, which is a product of earlier choices, or decision-making, or interpretation. This model can be seen as a model of semiosis. It also allows putting physiology and phenomenology (or physics and semiotics) into a natural connection.
Keywords: Code conflict; Incompatibility; Meaning making; Phenomenal world; Qualia; Scaffolding; Sign processes; Specious present; Time; Umwelt-generating systems.
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