Public health vaccination policies for containing an anthrax outbreak

Nature. 2004 Dec 16;432(7019):901-4. doi: 10.1038/nature03087.

Abstract

Concern about biological weapons has raised questions about the most effective public health policies to contain an anthrax outbreak. We developed a probability model to predict the impact of different anthrax antibiotic and vaccination policies. An anthrax outbreak can be significantly contained by minimizing the delay until initiation of antibiotic prophylaxis. However, even if mass distribution of antibiotics is completed within six days of the initial exposure, then at most about 70% of cases can be prevented. Post-exposure vaccination will not significantly increase that prevention rate if adherence to antibiotic regimens is similar or higher than that attained in the 2001 US outbreak. However, post-exposure vaccination can be useful either in shortening the duration of a prolonged antibiotic regimen, in the event of an antibiotic-resistant strain, or if antibiotic adherence rates are very low. Here we show that a mass pre-exposure vaccination programme for the general population would require very high population coverage rates to significantly increase prevention rates from that achieved with targeted and rapid post-exposure prophylaxis programmes.

Publication types

  • Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.

MeSH terms

  • Anthrax / epidemiology*
  • Anthrax / immunology
  • Anthrax / prevention & control*
  • Anthrax Vaccines / administration & dosage*
  • Anthrax Vaccines / immunology
  • Antibiotic Prophylaxis / methods*
  • Disaster Planning
  • Disease Outbreaks / prevention & control*
  • Disease Outbreaks / statistics & numerical data
  • Humans
  • Mass Vaccination / methods
  • Models, Biological
  • Probability
  • Public Health / methods*
  • Time Factors
  • Treatment Outcome
  • Vaccination / methods*

Substances

  • Anthrax Vaccines